Using experiments, we examine whether the decision to trust a stranger in a one-shot interaction is equivalent to taking a risky bet, or if a trust decision entails an additional risk premium to balance the costs of trust betrayal. We compare a binary-choice Trust game with a structurally identical, binary-choice Risky Dictator game with good or bad outcomes. We elicit individuals' minimum acceptable probabilities (MAPs) of getting the good outcome such that they would prefer the gamble to the sure payoff. First movers state higher MAPs in the Trust game than in situations where nature determines the outcome.
Introduction
"It's a vice to trust all, and equally a vice to trust none." This sentiment-from Seneca's Letters to Lucilius-inspired our research on when and whom to trust. Seneca, the great Roman first-century statesman and philosopher, recognized that trust always involves a gamble. Nineteen centuries later, playwright Tennessee Williams noted the distinctive costs of betrayal: "We have to distrust each other. It's our only defense against betrayal."
Today's world of depersonalized investments and purchases by Internet enables us to secure great benefits from specialization, thus catering to particular preferences and providing diversification. But one price of engaging in consequential relationships at a distance is that one must choose to trust strangers. This paper conducts experiments to determine if the decision of whether or not to trust a stranger in a one-shot interaction is equivalent to taking a risky bet, or if trust decisions entail an additional risk premium to balance the costs of trust betrayal.
To differentiate between risk preferences and possible betrayal costs as factors in decisions, we employ a novel design for trust experiments. 1 We compare a binary-choice Decision problem, where nature determines the outcome if people decide to trust, with a binary-choice Trust game offering the same setup and payoffs.
We consider a decision format where a first mover (the Decision Maker) has to choose between S (sure-thing) and T (trust). S results in a sure outcome S and T yields a risky outcome that can be either G (good) or B (bad) for the Decision Maker. The Decision Maker's preference ordering is G > S > B. We first consider the decision when the chance outcome after T involves a lottery. We then see what happens when the outcome after T is determined by a second mover (the Trustee), whose payoffs at B, G, and S, are respectively C, H, and S, with C > H > S. ( A large body of work on trust, crossing many disciplines, assumes that the willingness to trust is closely associated with the willingness to take risk (for example, within economics see Ben-Ner and Putterman 2001; within philosophy see Luhmann 1979 ; within sociology, see Cook and Cooper 2003) . 3 Empirical evidence, however, is mixed. Results seem to depend on the measurement procedure used. Eckel and Wilson (this volume) find that subjects' self-reported risk attitudes (or "sensation seeking" as measured by the Zuckerman Scale) influence the trust decision in a simplified version of the investment game (Berg et al. 1995) , but subjects' revealed risk preferences for financial stakes do not. Ashraf et al. (2003) also do not find any relationship between risk preferences revealed in a risky-choice tasks and trust decisions in the investment game.
Snijders and Keren (1998) measure risk directly in a trust game similar to ours.
They define risk as (S-B)/(G-B), which gives the probability of earning G that makes a risk neutral person indifferent between trusting and not trusting. Varying the payoff structure, the authors find that the risk ratio strongly affects trust. In addition to risk, the willingness to trust is also influenced by "temptation," (C-H)/(C-B), a measure of the Trustee's incentive to betray trust.
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While an attractive design, the risk preferences measured by Snijders and Keren (1998) are influenced by the fact that risk is evaluated in the context of a Trust game.
Risk taking may be influenced by the Decision maker's expectations of trustworthiness 3 See also the recent survey of trust experiments by Camerer (2003) . Hardin (2002) critically discusses the approaches that equate trust with a gamble or a risky investment.
4 They find that subjects with an organ donor card also trusted more, suggesting that trust is also related to other-regarding preferences (which is corroborated by the findings by Ashraf et al. 2003 and Cox 2003) .
(or expected "temptation"), and by the fact that it is not nature but another person who decides whether the Decision Maker will earn B or G. In contrast, the instruments used to measure risk preferences in the studies by Ashraf et al. (2003) and Eckel and Wilson (this volume) seem to be quite removed from the Trust decision, involving choices between lotteries whose payoffs differ from the payoffs used in the Trust game. Most importantly, the typical choice task in a risky decision experiment does not involve a second person.
Rather, the first mover's choice affects only his own payoffs and does not lead to potential payoff differences between him and a second person. We address these issues in our design.
We start with a standard risky-choice task, the Decision problem. For it, we elicit people's minimum acceptable probabilities (MAPs) of earning G for which they would just prefer the gamble to the sure payoff S. We inform subjects that prior to the experiment we determined a probability, p*, of receiving G. If their MAP is higher than p*, they will earn S. However, they will play the gamble with probability p* if their MAP is lower than or equal to p*. The higher one's MAP, the higher p* must be for the person to choose T over S. Thus, the less one likes one or both outcomes in T, the higher will be one's MAP. This mechanism is incentive compatible, i.e., a rational Decision
Maker should be indifferent between S and the gamble with the reported MAP, since individuals cannot affect the probability they receive in the lottery. 5 This is equivalent to asking a consumer her willingness-to-pay for a good, with the understanding that the good will be purchased at the market price if the market price turns out to be lower than the stated price. She has no reason to misrepresent. This is a theoretical argument. We cannot exclude the possibility that our elicitation procedure affects behavior differently than, for example, a standard choice task. Boles and Messick (1990) , for example, found that people sometimes regret the consequences that result when such minimal thresholds are implemented.
Our procedure is closely related to the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak elicitation procedure. The principal difference is that we do not generate p* randomly from a uniform distribution. In the Trust game, p* depends on the distribution of Trustees'
actions. Given our procedure, truth-telling is as good as anything else. It is strictly dominant-the accomplishment of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism-if subjects subjectively assign positive probability to values of p* in the immediate neighborhood of their MAP. Potential differences in subjective probability distributions in the three decision situations do not matter as long as this condition is satisfied.
Our goal is to compare the Decision problem to the Trust game. However, the Trust game has an additional element beyond the Decision problem: payoffs go to two players, the Decision Maker and a second person. To reproduce this element apart from a trust situation, we developed a second treatment, the Risky Dictator game. In it, the Decision Maker's choice affects a Recipient's payoffs as well as his own. The Recipient is merely that; she makes no decision. As before, the Decision Maker can take a sure payoff, S, or take a chance between G and B. The probability of earning G is p*. His Schmidt 1999, Bolton and . Fehr and Schmidt (2001) survey the evidence. For the numerical payoffs we employed, altruism and efficiency preferences increase the attractiveness of the gamble in the Risky Dictator game compared to the Decision problem. This would lead to lower MAPs in the former than in the latter. By contrast, inequality aversion makes the gamble less attractive, inducing higher MAPs in the Risky Dictator game than in the Decision problem. The net influence of the two effects is unclear, and would presumably depend on the size of the payoffs.
Our main interest is in the differences in decisions taken in the Trust game and in the two other games. Our principal hypothesis is that it is fundamentally different to trust another person than to rely on a random device that offers the same outcomes: people are averse to being betrayed. 7 Betrayal aversion is in line with recent theoretical models and empirical evidence that people care about how outcomes came to be, or others' intentions (Rabin 1993, Charness and Rabin 2002) . Thus, we conjecture that we will see higher MAPs in the Trust game than in the Risky Dictator game. We also hypothesize that such differences in MAPs apply to all demographic sub-groups. Even though some groups may be more risk averse or less likely to trust than others, we expect betrayal aversion to be a universal phenomenon. This paper tests main effects and controls for differences between various demographic sub-groups.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the central hypothesis, and
Section 3 the details of the experimental design. Section 4 reports the results, and Section 5 concludes.
Central Hypothesis
Our central hypothesis is that individuals incur an additional, non-monetary loss when their trust is betrayed by their Trustee. This will make them more reluctant to take a chance on another individual being trustworthy, as opposed to taking a chance on a random device. We measure this effect by comparing MAPs across games.
Consider an individual with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences choosing between S and T for the Decision problem described in the Introduction. He attaches utilities to the three outcomes, denoted as U S , U G and U B . His MAP will satisfy the equation
recent issue of Science, Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund (2000) called trust and reciprocity the "basis of all human systems of morality", and Sissela Bok (1978: 31) argued that "whatever matters to human beings, trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives."
Solving for MAP, we have
Note that this formulation is general, and can allow for a payoff to another player.
Thus, it applies to the Risky Dictator (RD) and Trust games (Trust), not merely the Decision problem (DP).
Our principal conjecture is that when a Decision Maker gets the bad outcome in the Trust game-when his trust is betrayed-he incurs an additional negative element.
We call this a betrayal cost. This implies that
even when the monetary payoffs are the same in the two games.
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What happens to MAP as U B falls? A falling U B makes the gamble less attractive, implying that MAP will have to be raised if the decision maker is to remain indifferent between S and T. 9 Hence, our theory predicts that individuals will have a greater MAP for the Trust game than for the Risky Dictator game, although the payoffs are identical:
MAP Trust > MAP RD .
Experimental design
We employ three treatment conditions to test for the role of betrayal aversion, a Decision problem, a Risky Dictator and a Trust game. The games have identical payoffs 8 We assume that U S and U G are the same in the two games. We will further discuss different assumptions for U S below. U G(Trust) > U G(RD) if people derive an additional benefit from having trust rewarded (an "honor reward") that exceeds the utility from a good outcome produced by chance. If honor rewards matter, betrayal costs have to be larger to lead to our prediction: MAP Trust > MAP RD . We observe net outcomes in our experiments only. They could be due to betrayal costs or to a combination of betrayal costs and honor rewards. 9 The derivative of MAP with respect to U B is negative as
2 . This implies that a falling U B increases the MAP.
for the Decision Maker. The Risky Dictator game and the Trust game have a second player, called respectively Recipient, and Trustee. In our experiments, S=10, G=15, B=8, H=15, and C=22. The payoffs were presented to subjects in a matrix form with neutral terminology. (See Table A .1 in the Appendix.) Payoffs were given in points, which were converted 1:1 into US dollars at the end of the experiment.
Our experiments were run in the experimental laboratory of the Harvard Business We did not inform any of our subjects on the value of the probabilities involved in the risky choice but asked them to indicate their minimum acceptable probability (MAP) of earning G such that they would be willing to accept the gamble rather than the sure outcome. If their MAP was higher than a predetermined probability, p*, they were taken to reject the chance outcome. They were paid the sure payoff. If their MAP was lower than or equal to p*, we conducted the lottery (Decision problem and Risky Dictator game) or let the Trustee decide (Trust game). The lower one's MAP, the more one is willing to take the risk.
The value of p* was established by the fraction of Trustees who chose to reward trust in the Trust game in the first two sessions. Though it was not necessary for the experiment, the payoffs were selected (and pre-tested in classroom experiments) so that the expected fraction of trustworthy Trustees would be close to the value of p that makes a risk neutral player indifferent between choosing the sure outcome or the gamble, which implies a 0.285 chance of G. In the first Trust experiment, 4 out of 14 Trustees rewarded trust (p=0.286) and in the second session, 5 out of 17 Trustees rewarded trust (p=0.294), or p=0.290 overall. In practice, we set p* = 0.29 by having 29 white marbles in an urn of 100 marbles.
In the Decision problem and the Risky Dictator game, we informed Decision Makers that p* had been determined before they made their decisions. They were not told how it was arrived at. The value of p* was written on a piece of paper and sealed in an envelope that everyone could see taped to the blackboard.
The Trust game required a different treatment for p*. We asked Trustees whether they would pick G if the Decision Maker selected T. Each session was organized as follows:
Description of the game and the rules of conduct (identical for Decision Makers and second movers for games that involve both).
The payoffs were presented and described both in writing and orally to establish common knowledge. Subjects were informed that this was a one-shot interaction, that, except in the DP, they were randomly matched with another person present in the room, that they were identified by code numbers only and would remain anonymous.
Explanation of decisions (different for Decision Makers and second movers).
The Decision Makers and the second movers were given different sets of instructions, detailing their own decision. They were not informed on the exact wording of their counterpart's decision. Most importantly, Trustees were not informed that Decision Makers were asked to state their MAP of being paired with a Trustee who rewards trust since we did not want Trustees to try to influence p*. Decision Makers knew that Trustees were neither informed on p* nor that their actions would determine p*. a. Decision Makers were asked in the three games: Trust: "How large would the probability of being paired with a Person Y who chose option 1 have to be for you to pick B over A?" DP and RD: "How large would p have to be for you to pick B over A?" In all treatments, they were toldd that if their p is lower than or equal to p*, they would play the gamble, and if it was higher than p*, they would earn S. b. Second movers were asked (Trustees in Trust, Recipients in RD and no second mover in DP) Trust: "Which option, 1 or 2, do you choose in case B?" RD: "Please wait until your counterpart has made a decision."
Quiz
We tested whether Decision Makers understood the task and made sure that everyone had answered the test questions correctly before continuing. 
Information on p* and its implications for each subject
We informed everyone on the details of the decision procedure and on p*.
Trust: Here p* was the fraction of Trustees who had chosen to reward trust in their session. If p* was greater than or equal to a Decision Maker's MAP, his Trustee's decision determined the outcome. If p* was less than her MAP, he got the sure outcome.
DP and RD: We opened the envelope and informed subjects that p*=0.29. If p* was greater than or equal to a Decision Maker's MAP, he got the gamble. 12 If p* was less than his MAP, he got the sure outcome.
Questionnaire and payment
Subjects completed a questionnaire (see Table A .2 in the Appendix) while we put their earnings in sealed envelopes marked with their code numbers. Subjects collected their earnings by presenting their code numbers.
Experimental Results
We focus on treatment effects first. We then test for their robustness by including some key demographic variables. Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize our primary findings. We now investigate the significance of those differences.
Result 1: MAP Trust >MAP RD
The mean and median MAPs are noticeably higher in the Trust game than in the Risky Dictator game. A nonparametric ranks test revealed that Trust game MAPs were significantly higher (Mann-Whitney Z=-3.430, p<0.01).
Our results suggest that the decision to trust is influenced by more than just risk, other-regarding, and efficiency preferences. People care not only about the payoff outcome but also about how the outcome came to be. They behave as though there is a betrayal cost above and beyond any dollar losses.
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Result 2:
MAP RD =MAP DP
The mean and median MAPs are quite similar in the Risky Dictator game and in the Decision problem. A nonparametric ranks test did not identify any significant differences. Our results suggest that a willingness to take a gamble that will definitely benefit another party is not strongly influenced on net by either payoff comparisons or efficiency differences.
There is an interesting anomaly in the Risky Dictator game at the bottom end.
28% of the Decision Makers had a MAP less than 0.285, the value that made T a breakeven proposition. Presumably, these individuals were motivated by altruism or by a concern for efficiency.
Our first two results are in line with our principal hypothesis, namely that there are significant betrayal costs. Indeed, these costs are sufficient to swamp any honor reward for receiving trustworthy behavior and getting G. As a result, subjects need a much higher chance to receive the good outcome to choose T in the Trust game than in the Risky Dictator game or the Decision problem.
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Result 3: Decision Maker's Choices by Own Demographic Category
Do our results differ by standard demographic categories? There was little variability in our subject pool in some important categories: All of our 145 subjects were students (76 percent undergraduates), 88 percent were younger than 30, 89 percent were American, 72 percent identified with a religion, and 92 percent ranked themselves in the lower half of the income distribution on a scale from 1 to 6 (see Table A .2 in the Appendix for the questionnaire).
Our sample varied most on gender and ethnicity. 42 percent of our subjects were female, and 33 percent identified themselves as members of an ethnic or racial minority.
We focus on these two characteristics. Recent survey evidence suggests that "members of a group that historically felt discriminated against," particularly minorities and women, are less likely than Caucasians or men to report that they "generally trust others" (Alesina and LaFerrara 2002: 207) . We examine whether women and minority group members in our experiment had higher MAPs than men and Caucasians, respectively. Table 2 gives the principal MAP results separately for each treatment condition by our demographic groups, focusing on race and gender.
15 While the sample sizes get quite small, we do want to note that the Decision Maker's identity seems to affect these assessments: Only 39 percent of the female but 59 percent of the male Decision Makers trust both sexes (chi 2 =2.959, p<0.1). 55 percent of the female Decision Makers trust women only and 30 percent of the male Decision Makers trust women only (chi 2 =4.586, p<0.05). 6 percent of the female and 11 percent of the male Decision Makers trust men only (tests n.a.). Only 45 percent of the minority responders but 76 percent of the Caucasians trust both categories (chi 2 =5.949, p<0.05). 50 percent of the minority Decision Makers but only 6% of Caucasians trust minority members only (chi 2 =17.883, p<0.01). 5 percent of the minority and 18 percent of Caucasian Decision Makers trust Caucasians only (tests n.a.). The ingroup bias seems most pronounced among the groups that have traditionally been discriminated against, women and members of minorities. We first compare results in the Decision problem. There were no significant differences in the values of MAPs by gender or ethnicity. That is, members of these groups were equally willing to take gambles on their own payoffs. If differences emerge in the Risky Dictator game or the Trust game, it will be because the groups have different preferences regarding payoffs to others, efficiency, or betrayal.
Looking at the Decision problem and the Risky Dictator game, we find that the MAPs of women and minorities do not differ between the two treatments. Men and Caucasians accept somewhat lower MAPs in the Risky Dictator game than in the Decision problem, implying either some other-regarding preferences or tastes for efficiency. 17 Our results are in line with earlier findings on gender and efficiency 16 We report the results on the ethnicity of the trusted parties here for completeness but we cannot interpret them due to the small sample sizes. preferences. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Ashraf et al. (2003) find that men respond more strongly to efficiency gains in various non-risky versions of the dictator game than women. While women have generally been found to be more generous (e.g., Frey 1999, Eckel and Grossman 1998) , the relative cost of or benefits from giving hardly affect their behavior. The relationship between race and risk, efficiency, and other-regarding preferences has received little study.
Our primary interest is in differences in behavior between the Trust game and the Risky Dictator game. For each of our demographic groups, the MAPs for the Trust game substantially exceed those for the Risky Dictator game with equivalent payoffs. This indicates that each of these groups is concerned with betrayal. Women and minorities appear to have higher Trust game MAPs than their complementary groups but these differences are not statistically significant.
Past evidence on the relevance of race and gender in trust experiments is mixed.
Results depend on the specifics of the experimental design (such as the degree of anonymity between the players), and the country where the experiments were conducted.
For a subject pool similar to ours, Glaeser et al. (2000) report that minority and female
Harvard undergraduates are less likely than others to trust. Croson and Buchan (1999) find no significant gender differences in trust experiments in the US and various Asian countries. Ashraf et al. (2003) also report no significant gender differences but that minority groups are less likely to trust (the race gap is more pronounced in South Africa than in the United States). In a recent large-scale experiment focusing on gender, Buchan et al. (2003) find that female students are less likely to trust than male students. Eckel and Wilson (2003) are among the few who report a higher trust rate for American women than for men. Generally, demographic variables seem to be more strongly associated with the Trustee's decision of whether or not to be trustworthy than with the Decision Maker's decision of whether or not to trust (Croson and Buchan 1999 , Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 2002 , Cox 2003 , Eckel and Wilson 2003 .
Result 4: Decision Maker's Choices by Preferred Demographic Category of Counterpart
Rather than focusing only on subjects' own characteristics, we may learn more about why Decision Makers demanded a certain MAP by looking at the demographic characteristics of their preferred counterpart. Thus, we asked our subjects what an "ideal"
Trustee would look like, focusing again on the six characteristics, age, ethnicity, gender, whether someone identifies with a religion, nationality, and economic situation (see Table A .2). Within all categories of respondents, a majority indicates that it trusts all groups.
Focusing on ethnicity/race, 67 percent of our respondents indicate that they trust both Caucasians and members of a minority, 19 percent trust minority members only, and 14 percent trust Caucasians only (see Table A .3 in the appendix). Gender presents a different picture. Only a slim majority of our Decision Makers trusts both men and women (51 percent); 40 percent trust women only; and 9 percent trust men only. The gender attributions of trustworthiness reported here conform to earlier findings on gender-role stereotypic attributions of cooperation and defection in the prisoners' dilemma game. King et al. (1991) found that both genders believe that a male is more likely to defect. Dictator game and the Decision problem are not statistically significant.
Result 5: Relative importance of treatment effects and demographic variables
To test more precisely whether our treatment effects are robust and whether the identified sub-population differences indeed matter, we ran an OLS regression on MAPs (see Table A whether the gender of the ideal Trustee is related to the requested MAPs, and whether it interacts with a subject's own gender. We find that independent of own gender, those both sexes (chi 2 =2.959, p<0.1). 55 percent of the female Decision Makers trust women only and 30 percent of the male Decision Makers trust women only (chi 2 =4.586, p<0.05). 6 percent of the female and 11 percent of the male Decision Makers trust men only (tests n.a.). Only 45 percent of the minority responders but 76 percent of the Caucasians trust both categories (chi 2 =5.949, p<0.05). 50 percent of the minority Decision Makers but only 6% of Caucasians trust minority members only (chi 2 =17.883, p<0.01). 5 percent of the minority and 18 percent of Caucasian Decision Makers trust Caucasians only (tests n.a.). The ingroup bias seems most pronounced among the groups that have traditionally been discriminated against, women and members of minorities. who trust only women demand significantly higher MAPs than those who either trust men only or both.
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Alternative explanations
Our principal result is that individuals have higher MAPs in the Trust game than in the Risky Dictator game with the same payoffs, or a Decision problem offering the same own payoffs. Such a finding suggests that betrayal costs are consequential-costs that make it less attractive to rely on a Trustee than a random device offering the same probabilities. However, in addition to-or in place of-betrayal costs, other elements could enter a Decision Maker's utility function. We discuss competing hypotheses here that could conceivably be compatible with our results.
It might appear that the desire to keep in control, rather than the costs of betrayal, could be reducing the attractiveness of the Trust game and leading to MAP Trust >MAP RD .
The controllability of risk has been identified as an important determinant of risk perceptions and risk taking in risky-choice tasks (e.g., Slovic et al. 1986 ). We rewrite equation (1) from above to take the cost relating to a loss of control, K, into account:
As the Risky Dictator game does not involve relinquishing control to a second person, equation (4) implies that
To compensate for the loss of control when trusting another person, a Decision
Maker thus would demand a higher MAP in the Trust game than in the Risky Dictator game, which is what we find.
Alternative costs in the Trust game (suggested by one of the referees) include assessment costs (i.e., the cost related to having to assess someone's trustworthiness), costs of making a mistaken assessment, and costs from putting another person into an uncomfortable situation (also leading to U S(Trust) >U S(RD) ). A final alternative explanation might be that Decision Makers dislike earning money due to another person's kindness (leading to U G(Trust) <U G(RD) ).
A MAP gives us information on how a Decision Maker assesses the risky-choice problem he is confronted with, but not on how he values each possible outcome. Based on our data, we are not able to distinguish whether differences in MAPs are due to different assessments of S or of B and G. However, a number of recent experimental results are compatible with betrayal costs but not with any of the alternative hypotheses.
In gift-exchange experiments, for example, employers play a trust game with their employees. They have to decide whether to offer a high or a low wage to encourage employees to respond with high effort. Offering a high wage is risky as employees may shirk, but it may also induce fair-minded employees to reciprocate such trust with high effort levels. Several studies have found that employers are willing to pay for the opportunity to punish untrustworthy employees (for a summary, see Gächter and Fehr 2001) . Such behavior, we believe, is consistent with betrayal aversion but not with an aversion to losing control, making a wrong assessment, relying on another's kindness or confronting another person with an uncomfortable decision.
Conclusions
For thousands of life's risky decisions, be they of the heart or the wallet, from the everyday to the fundamental, trust is a critical ingredient. Economists now recognize that trusting is required if a society is to prosper. Trust has been shown to contribute to economic growth Keefer 1997, Zack and Knack 2001) , and to enhance some of the factors that promote it, such as judicial efficiency and reduced corruption (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Vishny and Shleifer 1997).
Trust involves a chance outcome under the control of another party; e.g., will the businesswoman deliver a product of the quality she promised? Some risks effectively involve a lottery process: will the crop be good, will stock X increase in value. Our experimental studies find that individuals are much more willing to take risks when the outcome is due to chance, as opposed to an equivalent-odds situation where the outcome depends on whether another player proves trustworthy. Taking a chance on the latter risks incurring betrayal costs, costs shown to be above and beyond mere monetary losses.
Betrayal costs may contribute to the distinction between intentional and accidental wrongs in both civil and common law. Intentional wrongs are more likely to meet the criteria of criminal conduct and thus, can be punished more severely. In addition, liability for intentional harm cannot be excluded contractually while the parties to a contract can agree to exclude liability for accidental wrongs. Lawmakers seem to understand that people have to be protected more from intentional than from accidental harm. Therefore, incentives have to be in place to keep Trustees from intentionally inflicting harm on Decision Makers. Absent such arrangements, as our results suggest, interactions based on trust may not take place. [N] = 31 55% 6% 39%
Appendix
[N] = 46 30% 11% 59%
[N] = 24 42% 17% 42%
[N] = 53 40% 6% 55% Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are OLS, clustered for experimental sessions. ^significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.
